YESTERDAY,
on his Tax Research UK website, Professor Richard Murphy posted a
very interesting piece on Brexit. It had originally been posted, by
David Kelly, an oil and construction industry SME (subject matter
expert), but, Professor Murphy thought it worthy of a wider audience.
The entire post can be accessed at:
I
had a look at it and decided, if I took Mr Kelly's Brexit analysis as
a template, but, substituted Super
6 for Brexit,
it sort of made sense. You might not agree with my conclusions or
arguments; you might not think comparing Brexit with Super 6 a good
idea, if so, feel free to argue with me, but, I would suggest, like
Brexit, Super 6 is a leap of faith, into the unknown, and, many of Mr
Kelly's conclusions are a constant, in analysing any project.
The
words in bold italics are Mr Kelly's, anything else, in red ink, is my wording:
“The
important distinguishing feature of a project is that it stops. This
is not manufacturing or running a shop. We make something, deliver
it, and the job is over. Super 6 is a project. But if we examine it
that way without any consideration as to whether it is “right” or
“wrong” to do, it is doomed to failure.
In
order for a project to be successful, there are some important
ingredients. Super 6 lacks all of them, except a “Project Must
Finish By” date, the only information that we have. On 1 May, 2018
the project finishes, when the successful Super 6 clubs are named.
Let
me painfully go through just some of the missing ingredients:
A
scope of work. Famously, there isn’t one. It is as if a
shipbuilding company had accepted a contract to deliver a ship in
March 2019, but nobody knows what sort of ship. All we know is the
launch date.
Budget.
There isn’t one. Mr
Dodson has said: “This
project will go ahead whatever.” He has not
firmed up the costs.
Contract
Management. The SRU
has started this job without knowing what the
terms and conditions are. Any of them. I cannot think of an analogy
that expresses my horror at this strongly enough, other than to
repeat it. We have started this job without knowing what the terms
and conditions are. We are going to negotiate the T&Cs as we
go along. How many times has that worked?
Benefit
analysis. If you believe £350m a week for the NHS, you will
believe anything I suppose, but in fairness there was a benefit
analysis available this June from the proponents of the project. I do
not think I am being too partisan if I suggest it has not stood up to
scrutiny. In essence – there isn’t one. There
was not one for Super 6.
Deliverables.
All projects of this size have a list of deliverables, rather than a
single event. The channel tunnel for example had operational
parameters of availability, running costs, number of passengers,
there will have been more I am sure. There are no quantified
deliverables for Super 6. We
have had: “The Premiership is not fit for purpose,” as a reason
for initiating Super 6. Murrayfield has never told us what it expects
Super 6 to deliver. This inflates dramatically
the impact of my next heading:
Expectations.
When we spend this much money on a project, there are expectations
which have to be met. If, for example, our shipyard successfully
builds two new ferries, but the service to users on the routes they
are deployed on does not improve, then it is likely that the
expectations of the users of the project will not be met and the
project may not be deemed a success.
What
do people expect from this project? Everyone has been allowed to
invent their own expectations. Madness must ensue. With Brexit: for
some it is control of immigration, for some it is leaving the single
market, for some “taking back control” whatever that means. What
are our expectations of Super 6?
One
could argue that with no scope of work, no budget, no benefit study
and no deliverables, expectation management is impossible. I do argue
that. And that means we have no way to measure:
Success.
There is no way to measure this. The project must then fail.”
Mr
Kelly concluded his Brexit piece with the following paragraphs:
“I
could carry on for a few thousand words more about what is
wrong/missing with this project. Can I see the risk register? I
thought not.
I
am often called in to project control environments to help improve
them. I certainly have plenty experience of projects that could have
gone better. The simple truth I have observed is that success or
failure is determined at or before the start, not the end of a
project. Project success is a function of how ready we are to start
the project. In more that forty years I have never seen a project
less ready to start.
At
the risk of tautology, this is technically the worst project I have
ever experienced, and I’ve been parachuted into some lulus. It is
hardly started and we are at the Supreme Court already.
All
of the above just spells failure. Indeed I suspect Brexit cannot be
done at all.
All
I can think of to make it better, is comfort eating.
Bring
on the doughnuts, I say.”
OK, a wee bit extreme, comparing the future governance of the Unitd Kingdom with a change in the format of the club game in Scottish Rugby. But, Super 6, as presently presented by the SRU, is a danger to the well-being of the club game in Scotland. The ramifications will be extreme. It deserves far-greater scrutiny, far-more explanation about what it is all about from Murrayfield. Far better that Murrayfield takes the whole of Scottish rugby with them.
At
the moment, Mr Dodson and the SRU seem to be like Theresa May and the
Brexiteers – saying, we will have things done our way, there is no
alternative.
That
is, quite simply, not going to work.








